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It has been about a decade since the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society came into force. 
During that time, the percentage of dual-career households has overtaken the percentage of male 
breadwinner households; as a result, the situations of working males and females have gradually 
started to change. On the other hand, the roles of males and females are still fixed; the culture of 
mainstream males working long hours is deeply rooted in this society, thus family-friendly policy 
benefits tend to be seen as available only to females. For instance, the percentage of 
maternity/paternity leave takers is 88.5% female and 0.57% male. 1  Moreover, although the 
proportion of all childbearing women who were in work and who took maternity leave increased 
from 5.1% during 1985-1989 to 13.8% during 2000-2004, the proportion of working women who 
did not take maternity leave decreased from 19.9% during 1985-1989 to 11.5% during 2000-2004. 
This means that the increase in take-up of maternity leave came entirely from within the constant 
25% or so of women in work from the mid-1980s to today, and thus that there was no consequent 
rise in regular employment.2   
Certainly, the law has effectively protected the right of females to be able to continue working; 
however, practically it is difficult for female workers to maintain their work-life balance without 
governmental and/or organisational support. And it is important to clarify who actually pays for 
family-friendly service. Taking the above situation as a starting point, the aim of this study is to 
focus on family-friendly policy within the fringe benefits that companies provide, then analyse the 
effects of individual family-friendly policies on workers’ wages. In order to address the problem, it 
refers to the work of Heywood et al. (2007), which analysed the effect of family-friendly policies on 
wages by using cross-sectional data from the UK Workplace Employment Relations Survey 1998. 
This study considers the case of Japan. Family-friendly policy measures are a part of the fringe 
                                                   
1 Source: Basic Survey on the Female Employment 2006, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. 
2 Source: The 13th Report for Fertility Trends 2006, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. 
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benefits provided by an organisation; therefore, the components differ from organisation to 
organisation.3 Figure 1 shows the data set being used for this study as one focusing on the number 
of respondents by gender to the statement ‘the organisation which I belong to has adopted a 
family-friendly policy’. Figure 1 tells us that there is not much difference between males and 
females on this issue. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that there are obvious differences among 
males and females in the actual take-up of family-friendly policy benefits. Therefore, this study 
estimates the effect on wages, first for both genders resulting from the adoption of family-friendly 
policies, and then for males and females separately as a result of actual take-up.  
  To analyse the effects of family-friendly policy on wages, Section 2 reviews previous studies on 
the provision of family-friendly practices. Section 3 introduces the methodology and data. The 
fourth section presents estimates of empirical analysis and considers the results. Finally, the fifth 
section discusses the findings and concludes the study by suggesting a few implications. 
 
2 Literature Review 
  The labour force participation rate of females in Japan has been described as the ‘M’ curve 
because they leave the workplace for reasons of marriage and/or childbirth, and then return to the 
labour market part-time after their children reach a certain age. This phenomenon has led research 
that examines the problems of family-friendly related issues. Certainly, family-friendly policies do 
not single out one gender. However, most related studies focus on females because most of the users 
are female. For example, Tomita (1994) emphasised the relatively high needs of females for flexible 
working hour policies. The findings indicate that organisations which provide such leave show not 
only a high proportion of female workers, but also high stability in their workforce. In turn, Shigeno 
and Ohkusa (1998) clarify that although maternity leave does not affect the individual's decision on 
                                                   
3 For instance, over a one-year period of statutory maternity leave and over a three-month period of statutory elder care leave. 
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whether or not to marry, it does promote stability. The results tally with many studies supporting the 
view that maternity leave fosters stability in female workers' circumstances (see also, Morita and 
Kaneko, 1998; Waldfogel et al., 1999). Apart from maternity leave, a large number of studies focus 
on flexible working arrangements which help workers to balance their work and life. These policies 
have been called family-friendly policies, and/or work-life balance policies. For instance, Wakisaka 
(2002) points out that the approaches towards family-friendly and equal opportunity policy vary 
according to size of organisation and industry. Kawaguchi (2002) further clarifies that 
family-friendly and equal opportunity policy are complementary to each other. Sakazume (2002) 
also confirms that policies influence such factors as employee motivation and the female leaving rate. 
In turn, Takeuchi and Matsushige (2008) found that improving family-friendly policies does not 
impact reward and/or wages of the female worker directly, but does so indirectly as these policies 
help them to work longer, thus increasing wages. However, on analysing whether family-friendly 
policy raises the retention rate of females, Matsushige (2008) concludes that neither policy adoption 
nor actual take-up have much effect when focusing on organisations that hired female university 
graduates in their early 20s. 
  In turn, there are an enormous number of studies in this field of family-friendly practices outside 
Japan. For example, the work of Shepherd et al. (1996) in analysing U.S. manufacture panel data 
shows that a flexible working schedule has effects on productivity. Meanwhile, Lanoie et al. (2001) 
analyse the impact of work-sharing on labour productivity in Canadian companies, then show that 
there is a significant negative effect. While Arthur and Cook (2004) emphasise that organisations 
which provide family-friendly policies gain significant returns, there is no one viewpoint about 
policies in terms of a cost and/or benefit relationship. On the other hand, Gariety and Shaffer (2001) 
analyse the U.S. Current Population Survey by examining industry, occupation, human capital, and 
needs of labour for family-friendly policies, then showing a correlation between flexible working 
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and higher wages. Heywood et al. (2007) analyse the Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
1998 using the full treatment effect model, and show that adopting family-friendly policies could 
have implications for wage costs.  
It is recognised that, overseas, family-friendly policy reduces the turnover rate and helps 
employees’ families. In particular, selected employees whose skills are high are offered more 
flexibility (Johnson and Provan, 1995; Barringer and Milkovich, 1998; Dex and Scheibl, 2002; 
Hashiguchi, 2008). For the above reasons, this study focuses on family-friendly policy and whether 
it is provided as a retention tool for productive employees by determining the effects of adoption of 
family-friendly policies and actual take-up of benefits on wages. At the same time, Heywood et al. 
(2007) point out that family-friendly policy related studies have not corrected for endogeneity 
attributed to the policy. In the case of Japan, on the other hand, Kawaguchi (2007) analyses through 
ordinary least squares (OLS) how equality policies and family-friendly policies affect wage and 
turnover behaviour, and shows that family-friendly policies have positive impacts on wages.4 
Consequently, the current study corrects endogeneity by using the full treatment effect model.  
 
3 The Methodology and Data 
3.1 The Methodology 
  To test the effect of individual family-friendly policies on workers' wages, first, we shall apply the 
wage equation which includes a family-friendly dummy through OLS (1).  
 
0 2( )i i i i iLn y X fE E E H      (1) 
y  = log monthly pay, X =controls, f =family-friendly dummy, and H =error term 
 
*
0 1 2i i i if retired skilld uJ J J       (2)  
                                                   
4 Ohta (2007) considers the level of fringe benefits on wages, then points out that based on theory, OLS estimates should be 
negative; however, they tend to be positive in many cases.  
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where 1if   if * 0if ! , 0if   otherwise . 
 
The treatment effect model (2) concerns the effect of two selected endogenous variables as 
treatment (retirement policy dummy=retired and self-learning dummy=skilld) to dependent variables. 
The wage equation and the determinants of the family-friendly dummy are jointly estimated through 
maximum likelihood.  
iH  and iu  have a bivariate normal distribution with covariance matrix. The input specifies the 
continuous dependent variable of the logarithm of the monthly wage as a linear function of the 
independent variables.5 The treatment is not included in the first variable list, but retired and skilld 
are specified as the exogenous variables in the treatment equation. These variables do not impact the 
estimation of earnings. Endogenous treatment estimates the family-friendly dummy for the values 0 
and 1 in order to lead to an unobserved latent variable. 
Independent variables include: age; age square; tenure; tenure square; occupation; education; 
living with either partner, child(ren) or parent(s); savings and investments in the last year; commute 
time (one-way, minimum); type of housing; number of paid holidays; and trade union membership. 
Latent variables are: (1) More than one year childcare leave policy; (2) More than a three-month 
elder care leave policy; (3) Family care leave policy; (4) Sick leave policy (other than paid holidays); 
(5) Per hour and a half-day paid leave policy; (6) Shifting start time and finish time policy; (7) 
Short-time work for childcare and elder care leave policy; and (8) Flexi-time and/or discretionary 
working hours policy. Table 1 shows a summary of Policies 1-8, classified by the adoption and 
take-up of family-friendly policies by gender. For policy adoption, males and females were taken 
together, but for benefit take-up, samples of male and female workers were taken separately. The 
individual policies 1-8 go into Equation (1) as independent variables.  
                                                   
5 Logarithm of monthly pay, calculated by dividing the respondents’ stated annual wage by 12. 
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Regarding policy adoption, Heywood et al. (2007) explain that either workers often do not know 
about adopted policies, or benefits are provided informally, or both. Apart from this, there is a 
sample selection problem because the data set uses samples drawn only from regular employees (ie 
workers in regular employment). Therefore, policies are endogenous and so OLS regression analysis 
contains risk, as the estimates could be biased. For example, although policies do not affect wages, 
the estimates may be misleading if they fail to consider disturbance correlation. In order to exclude 
this possibility, it is necessary to estimate wage function and the determinants of a family-friendly 
dummy, while at the same time considering a correlation of disturbance. The treatment effect model 
corrects for the endogeneity of family-friendly policies. It uses treatment consisting of a ‘retirement 
policy dummy’ and a ‘self-learning dummy’. The former is a worker who is eligible to make use of a 
retirement benefit,6 and the latter is a worker who gives one or more of the following reasons for 
undertaking self-learning: because it is ‘employer requested’; ‘it helps my current job’; ‘for 
promotion’; or because ‘education and training benefits are available’. The retirement policy dummy 
and self-learning dummy are chosen for treatment for the following reason. While the self-learning 
dummy is a proxy of education and/or training cost for worker productivity, housing-related policy 
and retirement policy have assumed a symbolic role as major retention tools in Japan, and are 
subsequently being used as treatments.7  However, because the housing related policy dummy 
correlates to wages; only the retirement policy dummy has been selected for use as a treatment with 
a self-learning dummy.8 
 
 
                                                   
6 Applying the retirement policy correlates to wages. Therefore, the calculation used interaction dummy of the retirement policy × 
junior high school and high school diploma. 
7 See Inoki (1995) and Tachibanaki (2005) for details. 
8 Heywood et al. (2007) used two variables for the treatment: one is the manager’s response to the statement that it is the worker’s 
responsibility to balance the competing demands of work and family, and the worker’s own views. The other is the worker’s view of 
whether or not management cares about their family responsibilities. 
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3.2 The Data 
 The data set used in the current study is the Survey of Company Fringe Benefits provided by the 
Life Insurance Culture Centre in 2002 (Social Science Japan data archive). These surveys have been 
conducted since 1980; this is the eighth. The samples are chosen from an area within Tokyo 
Metropolitan District and in cities with a population of 500,000 or more, and designated five or more 
regular employees of private companies (a worker who is in charge of fringe benefits or personnel). 
The samples consist of 2,014 companies, 1,802 regular employees and 300 non-regular employees. 
In this chapter, the data set of 1,802 regular employees is used. Since more than one worker may be 
associated with a single workplace; all estimates are calculated with the Huber/White adjusted 
standard errors to account for workplace-specific heteroscadasticity. An advantage of using this data 
set is the richness of fringe benefits and family-friendly policies-related data, as these made it 
possible to create dummies to be used for treatment. However, the sample number is limited. 
Moreover, it cannot match company and worker data, nor can it be used as panel data. Taking into 
account these data limitations, the current study analyses the effects of family-friendly policy on 
wages through a treatment that considers worker productivity. 
 
4 Results  
4.1 Data description 
  Table 2 presents a summary of the data. As described above, it shows a basic analysis of male and 
female workers, dependent variables of a natural logarithm of monthly wages, independent variables 
and eight kinds of family-friendly policies, as well as treatment dummies. The average age of 
respondents is 38.9 years, average tenure is 13.57 years, and clerical work is the most common 
among the classified occupations.  
  It also shows that university graduates are the most numerous, followed by high school graduates, 
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as well as showing an average of the respondents living with a spouse, unmarried child(ren), and/or 
parent(s). The summary also includes the following factors: number of paid holidays; savings and 
investments in the last year; type of housing; and membership of trade union. In addition, company 
data which cannot be matched to the data for workers provides information on where the 
respondents work with fewer than 100 employees in small businesses, manufacturing, commercial, 
industrial and service sectors.9 
 
4.2 Regression Results  
  Tables 3 to 5 present results of OLS and the full treatment effect estimation. The results of the full 
treatment effect model are partially supported as they show that the endogeneity has been corrected. 
First, Table 3 presents the result of policy adoption estimated by OLS (upper part) and the treatment 
effect model (lower part).10 From the top, the results of OLS show significant difference at the 1% 
level for all except Policy 6, but all have a positive effect on wages. Regarding the results of full 
treatment effect estimation, the likelihood ratio (LR) test is significant only for Policy 1. The 
coefficients of policies are all larger than the OLS, and Policy 8 has changed from a positive to a 
negative impact. Female dummies emerge with the most significant and negative coefficient of all. 
Age also takes a significant and negative coefficient. Age squared as well as tenure take significant 
and positive coefficients. Occupation dummies show negative coefficients, and for education 
dummies all emerge with significant and positive effects on wages except high school graduates. 
Although coefficients are not significant, living with a spouse shows a positive effect on wages, 
whereas unmarried child(ren) and parent(s) have a negative effect. The number of paid holidays, 
                                                   
9 According to the company data, the breakdown of company size is: 5-20 employees = 742, 39-49 employees = 887, 100-299 
employees = 270, and more than 300 employees = 115. In turn, the industry breakdown is: construction = 277, manufacturing = 587, 
commercial = 465, transportation and electric power = 145, service sector = 505, and other= 35. 
10 This is also confirmed by the estimation results for policy adoption for males and females separately. The results show that the 
impacts are positive on wages in OLS for both genders (data not shown). 
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amount of savings and investments in the last year, and commuting time are statistically significant 
and positive. As regards housing, living together in the parents’ house emerges with a significant and 
negative coefficient. Working for a company without a trade union takes a negative coefficient, but 
not a significant one. 
Table 4 presents the effects of policy take-up on male wages. The results of OLS present only 
Policy 4 and Policy 5 as significant effects on wages. On the other hand, full treatment effect 
estimation shows results of the Wald test as it is statistically significant on Policy 3 and Policy 5 only. 
Policy 4 and Policy 5 stand out clearly among all the individual policies as having a significant 
effect on wages. Policy 1, Policy 2 and Policy 7 did not even converge. The reason for 
non-convergence may have been the small sample size. Table 1 indicates that only 4, 0, 2, and 4 
respondents respectively took up Policy 1, Policy 2, Policy 3, and Policy 7. These low take-up 
policies are policies which relate to childcare and elder care. For a description of other variables, the 
tenure and tenure square effect is 0. Age and age-square have significant negative and positive 
coefficients respectively. Occupations take a significant and negative coefficient; on the other hand, 
education shows a positive but insignificant effect on wages except university graduates on .Policy 6. 
Living with a spouse takes a significant and positive coefficient, while child(ren) and parent(s) take a 
positive, but insignificant coefficient. The number of paid holidays, amount of savings and 
investments in the last year, and commute time take a significant and positive coefficient. On the 
other hand, housing in general shows a negative impact on wages, with living in the parents’ house 
taking a particularly significant negative coefficient. In turn, trade unions emerge as insignificant.  
  Table 5 presents the effect of policy take-up on female wages. The result of OLS shows a negative 
impact on Policy 1, Policy 2 and Policy 7. These are not significant except in the case of Policy 2. 
Policy 3 to Policy 6 show significant positive coefficients. In turn, the results emerging from the full 
treatment effect model show that none of the Wald test results is significant. In addition, Policy 2, 
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Policy 3 and Policy 4 did not converge. There are a sufficient number of responses for estimation, as 
Table 1 shows. This means that, in contrast to the case of the males, not the number of respondents, 
but the treatment may fail to fully affect the determinants of the family-friendly dummy. And the 
take-up of family-friendly policies by females shows different tendencies from males in comparison 
with OLS and the full treatment effect model. The results of full treatment effect model estimation 
present a positive effect for Policies 1, 5, and 6. Both Policy 7 and Policy 8 show a negative effect on 
female wages, although they are not statistically significant. The  results for other independent 
variables are as follows: Tenure shows almost no impact, but is positive at a 10% level of 
significance. Tenure square is 0. Occupations, except professionals, take a significant and negative 
coefficient. Education determines a significant and positive coefficient. Other than occupations and 
education, the coefficients are relatively low; however, living with a spouse, child(ren) and/or 
parent(s) has a negative impact on wages of relatively high significance. Savings in investments in 
the last year has a positive coefficient at the 1% significant level. Paid holidays and commuting time 
have a positive coefficient, but while the former partially take significant coefficients, the latter is 
insignificant. Neither housing dummies nor trade union dummies are statistically significant. 
It has been confirmed so far that the results of a full treatment effect model estimation show that 
childcare and elder care-related policies either do not converge or take a negative coefficient, while 
the treatment could not fully compensate for endogeneities in family-friendly policy.11 It is therefore 
important to examine how the treatment works to determine the family-friendly policy dummy, so 
that it adds to an analysis of probit model estimation within this model. 
Table 6 presents the probit estimates classified by policy adoption, policy take-up by males, and 
policy take-up by females. First, the effects of the retirement policy dummy for Policies 1, 2 and 3 
                                                   
11 Since Policy 1 is negative for male wages in both OLS and full treatment effect estimation, a positive effect on female wages 
under Policy 1 in the results of the full treatment effect model should be considered together with the negative effect in OLS 
estimation, although the coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
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take a significant and positive coefficient at the 5% or 10% significance level. However, the results 
of the self-learning dummy emerge as statistically insignificant. Policy 8 is not statistically 
significant, and has a negative effect on wages. In turn, considering policy take-up for males, a 
self-learning dummy takes a positive and 1% significant coefficient on Policy 3. Looking at policy 
take-up for females, a self-learning dummy takes a positive and 1% significant coefficient on 
Policies 1 and 7. These policies are family-related policies; however, while estimates of wage 
function reveal that Policy 3 has a positive effect on male wages, Policy 7 takes a negative 
coefficient for female wages. Hence, just as females first experience the disadvantages of the gender 
wage gap, they may then experience wage costs when they use childcare and elder care policies no 
matter how productive they are as workers.  
To explain it differently, while Policy 8 and Policy 7 are both related to flexibility for working 
hours, who uses which policy varies as Policy 8 is taken up by both single and married workers, 
while Policy 7 is mostly taken up by married females. Therefore, the characteristics of Policy 7 and 
Policy 8 are different in terms of users’ attributes. For instance, results of probit estimates indicate 
that productive workers who contribute more to the organisation use Policy 7. 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Let us consider that results of probit estimates show that the retirement policy dummy and 
self-learning dummy have different influences in terms of policy adoption and actual take-up by 
males and females. For example, for policy adoption, the effects of the retirement policy dummy are 
positive and statistically 10% significant for Policies 1, 2 and 3 for adoption for both genders. The 
self-learning dummy, on the other hand, shows no influence on any policies, but provides the highest 
positive coefficients at the 1% significance level for Policy 1 (female), Policy 3 (male), and Policy 7 
(female). 
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To confirm this point, the retirement and housing related policy dummies are estimated through 
OLS and the full treatment effect model (data not shown). The results show that unlike childcare and 
elder care related policies, which become costs when workers use them, retirement and 
housing-related policy show a positive impact on wages. In other words, family-friendly policy has 
different characteristics from traditional fringe benefits which are known as retention tools. The 
difference could be explained by working hour co-ordination. 
According to Inoki (1995), there is a correlation between working hours and fringe benefits in 
Japan and France, but in opposite directions. For instance, in France, increasing fringe benefits’ costs 
and reducing working hours can be explained by an income effect. However, in Japan, the costs of 
fringe benefits are semi-fixed and co-ordinated with the amount of overtime worked, and when 
organisations face hardship, they reduce labour costs through reductions both in working hours and 
fringe benefits. In other words, companies and/or industries that provide more fringe benefits set a 
longer average overtime. If this is the case, then indeed family-friendly policy cannot be seen as the 
same as retirement and/or housing related policy. On the other hand, a generally-held view of fringe 
benefits in Japan currently is that organisations are tending to reduce housing related benefits (for 
example, Tachibanaki, 2005). This is consistent with the phenomenon of non-regular employment 
expansion in the Japanese labour market. It assumes that since organisations face an economic 
recession, reduced working hours and fringe benefits may not be enough and/or smaller sized 
organisations do not have the working hours and fringe benefits options available to much larger 
sized organisations. Under these circumstances, family-friendly policy could be in the interest of 
employers because of the user characteristic: productive workers. 
  In conclusion, the study aims to analyse the effect of family-friendly policies on wages by using 
the full treatment effect model. The results show that adopting policy is not a wage cost except in 
Policy 8. In turn, policy take-up differs between males and females. To put it concretely, by adding 
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the results of the probit model, it was found that family-related benefits tend to be taken up by 
productive male and female workers. However, the take-up of Policy 7 has a negative impact on 
female wages, as does Policy 8. These results, however, include limitations of sample use, and of 
endogeneity as this has not been fully controlled. Therefore, the use of a larger data set and/or panel 
data as well as full control of endogeneity are left for further analysis. 
  Based on concepts, Policy 8 should be categorised as a work-life balance policy. In turn, Policy 1 
and Policy 7 should be categorised as family-friendly policies. However, the self-learning dummy in 
Policy 8 as a proxy of productivity emerges as a negative coefficient; at the same time, Policy 8 has 
a positive impact on male wages and a negative impact on female wages. Although both Policy 1?
(OLS) and Policy 7 have a negative impact on female wages, the self-learning dummy in Policy 1 
and Policy 7 has a significant and positive impact. These results should be of concern when the 
importance of providing family-friendly support services is recognised under circumstances of a 
declining birth-rate in an ageing society. 
  Japanese organisations have covered social security largely on behalf of the government, and have 
developed fringe benefits including the symbolic policies of housing-related policy and retirement 
policy. However, housing related benefits have been reduced recently. This tendency is confirmed 
from company data available elsewhere. Therefore, this suggests that it is meaningful to enhance a 
family-friendly policy not only to be used as a fringe benefit, but also as a strategy of human 
resource management including as a retention tool and reward for productive workers. Implicit wage 









Arthur, M.M. and Cook, A. (2004). “Taking Stock of Work-family Initiatives: How Announcements 
of ‘Family-friendly’ Human Resource Decisions Affect Shareholder Value”, Industrial and 
Labour Relations Review, Vol.57, pp.599-613. 
 
Gariety, B. and Shaffer, S. (2001). “Wage Differentials Associated with Flextime”, Monthly Labour 
Review, Vol.124, pp.69-75. 
 
Hashiguchi, M. (2008). Flexible Working Arrangements and Specific Training in the Voluntary 
Sector: a Case Study, mimeo. 
 
Heywood, J. S., W. S. Siebert. and Xiangdong W. (2007). “The Implicit Wage Costs of Family 
Friendly Work Practices”, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol.59, pp.275-300. 
 
Inoki, T. (1995). “An International Comparative Study of Employee Benefits (Kigyo Nai 
Fukurikousei No Kokusaihikaku Ni Mukete)”, in Inoki, T. and Higuchi, Y., eds., The 
Employment System and Labour Market in Japan (Nihon No Koyou System To Roudou Shijyou), 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sya Inc., pp.101-124. 
 
Johnson, N.B. and Provan, K.G. (1995). “The Relationship between Work/ Family Benefits and 
Earnings: A Test of Competing Predictions”, Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol.24, pp.571-84. 
 
Kawaguchi, A. (2002). “Family-friendly Policies and Equal Opportunity Policies”, The Japanese 
Journal of Labour Studies, Vol.44 (6). 
 
Kawaguchi, A. (2007). “The Effects of Equality and Work-life Balance Policies on Wages and 
Turnover Behaviour (Kintouka Shiensaku To Work-life Balance Shisaku Ga Chingin To Risyoku 
Koudou Ni Oyobosu Eikyou)”, in JIL, The Report for the Support for Work-life Balance 
(Shigoto To Katei No Ryouritsu Shien Ni Kakawaru Chousa), Vol. 37, pp.60-78. 
 
Lanoie, P., Raymond, F. and Schearer, B. (2001). “Works Sharing and Productivity: Evidence from 
the Firm Level”, Applied Economics, Vol.33, pp.1213-20.  
 
Matsushige, H. (2008). “The Effects on Retention of Full-time Female University Graduates (Zyosei 
Daisotsu Seisyain No Teityaku Eno Eikyou)”, in Sato, H. and Takeishi, E., eds., Work-life 
Balance as a Human Resources Strategy (Hito Wo Ikasu Kigyou Ga Nobiru – Jinjisenryaku To 
Shiteno Work-Life Balance), Keisoshobo., pp.71-87. 
 
Morita, Y. and Kaneko, Y. (1998). “The Effects of Child-care Leave on Women in the Workforce 
(Ikuji Kyuugyou Seido No Fukyuu To Jyosei Koyousya No Kinzoku Nensuu)”, The Monthly 
16 
Journal of the Japan Institute of Labour (Nihon Roudou Kenkyuu Zassi), Vol. 459. 
 
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (Kokuritsu Syakai Hosyou?Jinkou 
Mondai Kenkyuujyo), ed., (2006), The 13th Report for Fertility Trends (Dai 13 Kai Syussei 
Doukou Kihon Chousa), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 
(Kokuritsu Syakai Hosyou?Jinkou Mondai Kenkyuujyo). 
 
Ohta, S. (2007). “Economic Analysis of Fringe Benefits”, The Japanese Journal of Labour Studies, 
Vol.49 (7). 
 
Sakazume, H. (2002). “Impacts of Family-friendly Practices on Employee Attitude and 
Organizational Performance”, The Japanese Journal of Labour Studies, Vol.44 (6). 
 
Shephard, E., Clifton, T., and Kruse, D. (1996). “Flexible Work Hours and Productivity: Some 
Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry”, Industrial Relations, Vol.35, pp.123-39. 
 
Shigeno, Y. and Ohkusa, Y. (1998). “The Effects of the Child-care Leave Program on the Marriage 
of Women and Their Continued Employment (Ikuji Kyuugyou Seido No Jyosei No Kekkon To 
Syuugyou Keizoku Heno Eikyou)”, The Monthly Journal of the Japan Institute of Labour 
(Nihon Roudou Kenkyuu Zassi), Vol. 459, pp.39-49.  
 
Tachibanaki, T. (2005). The End of Employee Benefits: A Correspondence to the Age of Inequality 
(Kigyou Fukushi No Syuuen: Kakusa No Jidai Ni Dou Taiou Subekika), Chuo Kouron Shinsya. 
 
Takeuchi, M. and Matsushige, H. (2008). “Effects of Intra-corporate Policies on the Work of Female 
Employees”, OSIPP Discussion Paper, DP-2008-E-009.   
 
Tomita, T. (1994). “The Effects of Parental Leave and Work Schedules on Women's Retention after 
Pregnancy (Jyosei Ga Hatarakitsudukerukotonodekiru Syokuba Kankyou)”, The Journal of 
Economic Studies, University of Osaka Prefecture (Osaka Furitsu Daigaku Keizai Kenkyuu), 
Vol.40 (1), pp.43-56. 
 
Wakisaka, A. (2002). “Conditions and Issues Involved in Utilizing Childcare Leave in the 
Workplace”, The Japanese Journal of Labour Studies, Vol.44 (6). 
 
Waldfogel, J., Higuchi, Y. and Abe, M. (1999). “Family Leave Policies and Women’s Retention after 
Childbirth: Evidence from the United States, Britain and Japan”, Journal of Population 





 “Basic Survey on the Female Employment”, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 
 http://www.mhlw.go.jp/houdou/2007/08/h0809-1/03-26.html 





???????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ????????? ???????????? ??????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????? ??? ???
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????? ??? ??
???????????????????????????? ???? ???? ??? ??
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????? ??? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????? ??? ???
????????????????????? ??????????????? ???????? ????? ????? ??? ??
???????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????? ??? ???
?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????? ??? ??
???????????????????????????????????? ??????? ????????? ???????????? ??????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ????? ? ???
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ????? ? ???
???????????????????????????? ???? ????? ? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ????? ?? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????? ??? ???
????????????????????? ??????????????? ???????? ???? ????? ?? ???
???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ????? ? ???




















































































????????? ???? ????????? ??? ???
?????? ??????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
???????? ????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ???????
?????????????????????????????????? ????? ???? ?????? ???????
??? ????? ????? ?? ??
??????????? ??????? ?????? ??? ????
?????? ????? ????? ? ???
?????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ??????
?????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
???????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
??????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
???????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
?????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
??????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
?????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
?????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
?????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
???????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
??????????????????????? ??????? ??????? ? ??
?????????????????????????????????? ???????? ???????? ? ????
?????????? ?????????? ??????? ??????? ? ???
???????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
???????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
??????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
??????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
??????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
???????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
????????????????????? ??????????????? ???????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?
??????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ? ?





















????????????????????? ??????????????? ???????? ??????
??????
???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ???
??????
?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ???
??????
??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ???
?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
?????????????????????????? ????


















?????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
??????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???
?????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ??? ?????? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ??
?????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
???????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
??????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
???????????? ??????? ? ??????? ??????? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? ??????? ??????? ?
??????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
????????????????????? ?????? ?? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ?? ?????? ? ?????? ??
?????????????????????????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ??
?????????????????????????? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ?????? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ?
?????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
???????????????????????????????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
????????????????????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
??????????????????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???
?????????????????????????????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???
?????????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ??
???????????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
????????????????????????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
??????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
??????????????????????????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
???????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???????
??????? ???? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????































??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ???
?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
?????????????????????????? ????















??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
??????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???
?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
?????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
???????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
??????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
???????????? ??????? ? ??????? ? ??????? ?? ??????? ? ??????? ??
??????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
?????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ? ??????
?????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
?????????????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???
???????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
??????????????????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???
?????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?? ?????? ??? ?????? ?? ?????? ??? ?????? ??
?????????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ?? ?????? ??? ?????? ???
????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ??
???????????? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ??
????????????????????????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
??????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
??????????????????????????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
???????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ????? ???
????????? ???? ? ???? ???? ??? ???? ????
































??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ???
?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
?????????????????????????? ????















??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
??????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???
?????? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ?
?????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????? ??????
???????? ??????? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? ??????? ?
????? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ??? ??????? ?? ??????? ??
??????? ??????? ?? ??????? ? ??????? ?? ??????? ? ??????? ?
???????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
??????????????????? ?????? ?? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ?? ?????? ??
????????????????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ??? ?????? ???
?????????????????????????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???
?????????????????????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???
?????????????????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
???????????????????????????????? ??????? ?? ??????? ??? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ??
????????????????????? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ??
??????????????????????? ?????? ? ?????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????? ?
?????????????????????????????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???
?????????? ?????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
???????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
????????????????????????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
??????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
??????????????????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
???????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ? ?????? ???
????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????












??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
??????????????????????? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ?? ??????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ???????
?????? ?????? ??? ?? ??????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ???? ??
??????????????????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ???????
??????? ??????? ??? ?? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ???? ??
?????????????????????????????????????????? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
??????????????????????? ? ? ?????? ?????? ?????? ? ?????? ? ??????
???? ?? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??? ??
??????????????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??????? ?????? ???????
???? ?? ?????? ??????? ?????? ???? ??
???????????????????????????????????????????? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
??????????????????????? ?????? ? ? ? ?????? ??????? ??????? ???????
?????? ?????? ??????? ??????? ???? ??
??????????????????? ?????? ??? ??????? ??????? ?????? ??? ???????
?????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ??
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
 
